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Large-Scale Transformation of Socio-Economic 
Institutions - Comparative Case Studies on CEECs 
Background Paper 2: Comparative Country Study - Hungary 
Ágnes Orosz (KRTK MTA) 
Abstract 
The general idea is to follow the Varieties-of-Capitalism literature on generating indicators on 
the economic systems actually implemented. However, this literature mostly concentrates on 
the enterprise (or micro) level in traditional OECD countries, categorizing countries between the 
extremes: liberal market economies and controlled market economies. It largely neglects the 
role of the government spending, the transition of former socialist countries and developing 
countries, and the political process behind the choice of an economic system.  
We broaden the perspective by combining the Varieties-of-Capitalism with the Worlds-of-
Welfare-States literature in order to provide a comprehensive view on government activities in 
transition. With the perspective of our contribution to WWWforEurope, we concentrate 
especially on social welfare, innovation systems, macro stability, and, of course, how these 
aspects work together (or not) and are explained by the political background.  
We will a cluster analysis for OECD and European transition countries and comparative country 
studies on Slovakia and Hungary. These countries are of special relevance because they 
represent extreme cases (Slovakia: significant switch in transition path towards star performer, 
Hungary: muddling towards problem case). One part of the comparative work concentrates on 
the comparison of Slovakia with other new EU members that also face to challenge of state 
building after dissolution of one or the other sort (Czech Rep. and the Baltics). The other part of 
the comparative work concentrates on Hungary in comparison with the other EU-CEECs. A 
broad based comparison will most likely be possible on available data only. The possibility for 
deeper qualitative comparisons will have to be determined during the project. The comparative 
components will focus on the macroeconomic background (Slovakia) and the welfare state 
(Hungary) respectively.  
Cluster analysis (initially forseen for MS25) and comparative country studies allows us to draw 
conclusions for the EU by providing a first comparison of the position of CEECs with respect to 
the “old” EU members, most interestingly the southern crisis countries that are often categorized 
into a form called mixed market economies with sometimes contradicting institutional set ups. 
Do CEECs converge towards prototype models or do they (still) constitute own models?  
   
 
Contribution to the Project 
Lessons from CEECs seem to be highly relevant for the transition of the EU towards 2020 goals 
because of the most profound and ambitious transfer of institutions in recent history which took 
place in these countries at different speed. Concerning the economic and especially the welfare 
system, the literature on varieties of capitalism has established two prototypes of capitalism – 
(LME) and Coordinated Market Economies (CME), a categorization that already divides EU-15 
in two groups (anglo-saxon vs. continental). MS23 provides a first set of lessons based on 
comparative country studies by asking if CEECs are converging towards prototypes of 
capitalistic systems or rather establish new types of capitalism.  
Keywords: EU integration, innovation, innovation policy, institutional reforms, macroeconomic 
disequilibria, market economy with adjectives, social development, welfare reform, welfare state 
Jel codes: P10, P51 
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Introduction 
The study focuses on the welfare state, the most important systemic element of capitalist models 
according to Sapir (2006).1
The formation and development of the welfare state among Central Eastern European countries 
(CEEC) has brought much attention. The collapse of the communist regime was followed by rapid and 
radical changes, institutions of parliamentary democracy have emerged and produced laws to 
harmonize with the new system, at the end a market-conform legal infrastructure has been installed. 
While rapid development of the private sector can be observed, the reform of the pension system, 
medical care and social assistance systems has been laid aside for several years (Kornai, 1997).  
 Research on the services of the welfare state may provide deep insight 
into capitalist models especially if it is done in this broader sense. For such a survey provides valuable 
systemic information not only on the levels of social cohesion and fiscal discipline (the efficacy and 
sustainability of the system, see Sapir, 2006), but also on how social institutions work and on the 
relationship of polity and economy. In this regard the analysis of the history of the past 30 years of 
Hungarian welfare system also clearly shows the weaknesses of social-economic institutions, the 
ongoing presence of state paternalism and the continuous shuttling of polity between two poles: the 
more authoritarian, Eastern type of capitalism, and the more democratic and controlled Western 
type. 
However, there are studies claiming that the post-socialist welfare state does not follow a single 
pattern, Deacon (1992), for instance, has predicted that Eastern European countries will develop 
their social policies in the future into distinct regimes that may even lie outside the three worlds of 
welfare capitalism described by Esping-Andersen (1990). The question of whether or not a specific 
CEEC model exists has been on the agenda for a long time. The transformation of the post-
communist welfare states involves communist legacies and strong elements of path-dependency as 
well as innovations and path-departing changes (Cook, 2010). In this paper we analyse the Hungarian 
welfare state with the aim of pursuing a fertile ground for future research that encapsulates the 
existence and homogeneity (or heterogeneity) of the CEEC model.  
If we look at the budgetary development of Hungary after the regime change, one can conclude that 
increased fluctuations in the fiscal balance may be a direct consequence of pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
interspersed with electoral budgets (i.e. deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios were always higher in time of 
elections). The existence of the fiscal cycles per se shows that the sustainability of the welfare state 
                                                          
1 This research paper is strongly related to and in accordance with the paper by Miklós Szanyi: Varieties of capitalism in 
Central and Eastern Europe. A theoretical framework for analysis (forthcoming).  
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played a second fiddle role, and the necessity for structural reforms was therefore highly neglected 
(Muraközy, 2008). Let us underscore that the Hungarian welfare state is often characterised by the 
term ’premature’ welfare state, coined by Kornai (1993, 1997) by calling the attention to the fact that 
the socialist regime did not leave behind a mature, but a system with significant distortions. If for no 
other reason than the transformation promised even more in terms of welfare services without 
mainly any rationalisation process in reining citizens’ expectations (Muraközy, 2008:156). Related to 
this, as Szalai (2007) emphasised, fundamental changes in the institutional aspects of welfare 
services remained merely at the declaration of goodwill (i.e. the management and control system as 
well as the ownership structure remained unchanged, an apparatus responsible for the principle of 
accountability was not established intensively, and the hierarchical management system remained 
almost unattained). On the other hand, the transition brought to life a series of changes (e.g. 
perceptible changes were registrable in the daily roles and tasks expected from service provisions, 
and in the interest and power relationships as well. The core problem of Hungary’s welfare system 
was that obviously a Nordic style welfare state was incompatible with the productivity level of any 
transition countries (Csaba, 1995). The question is how welfare institutions can be changed, however 
the generosity of the welfare state in Hungary has been cut back during the 1990s, and the initial 
distortions still have significant effects. 
1. Analysis of welfare state generosity of the different models 
Welfare generosity ratio is a simplistic measuring rod for assessing how well modern welfare states 
cope with the self-contradiction that while providing services they are generating at the same time 
increased demand for them. Two categories are mostly cited in the literature as most important 
factors affecting the welfare state, namely the aging population and the increasing level of 
unemployment (equal together the dependent ratio of the population). Based on the method of 
dividing the aggregates of social expenditures by the percentage of dependent population 
(population aged sixty-five and over and registered unemployed people) a simple ratio can be 
computed, measuring the generosity of welfare.2
                                                          
2 However the described method is a really simplistic way to measure the performance of the welfare state by neglecting 
several other important factors, general trends can be drawn to compare different models. Country groups are created 
based on Sapir (2006) and the cluster analysis conducted by Schweickert (2013). Methodology based on Castles (2004) pp. 
37, Table 2.4. 
 Theoretically it can be interpreted as the 
percentage of GDP received in welfare spending for every 1 per cent of the population in need 
(Castles, 2004:36). Welfare state generosity ratios put Hungary and the CEEC region on the map of 
the worlds of welfare states and allows us to compare welfare state policies of the country groups.  
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Analysing the result for the different models (Annex 1) it can be concluded that the generosity ratio 
of them all have converged (Firgure 1). By 2010 the Continental and the Nordic model have reached 
the same generosity level, meaning a significant cut and a salient increase respectively. The mean 
value of generosity for the Nordic countries went through significant decrease because Sweden and 
Norway radically cut back these types of expenditures, while for other Nordic countries this ratio has 
been increased. Coefficient variation of the Nordic generosity level is around 6 per cent compared to 
the overall 20 per cent value, generosity level in the Nordic countries is almost identical for 2011.  
Since 2009, the Continental CEECs converging towards the Continental countries and the Liberal 
countries show similar generosity trends, slightly below 1.0, while the Mediterranean countries after 
significant improvement (as a consequence of the EU accession) started to cut back welfare 
expenditures enforced by the crisis. Liberal CEECs countries have the lowest level of generosity and 
the reduction of generosity was the most radical among them between 1995 and 2000, however 
afterwards they have started to increase generosity again. 
Figure 1. Welfare state generosity ratios for different welfare state models 
 
Source: own calculation based on OECD SOCX dataset and World Bank data, for detailed methodology description see 
Castles (2004) pp. 37, Table 2.4. 
 
It is surprising that, since the 1990s, the coefficient variation has become significantly lower for all 
groups, except the CEECs. It can be understood as CEECs implement different policies in tackling the 
current crisis, while the other groups seem to be resistant to the crisis in perspective of the welfare 
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state reforms. Among Continental CEECs, Hungary has reduced its generosity level to the greatest 
extent, having the lowest level within its group in 2011. The level of social protection has been still in 
sharp contradiction with the general level of development, resulted in too generous welfare system 
at the time of the transition and afterwards. In order to solve the above mentioned mismatch as a 
consequence of the inherited premature nature of the Hungarian welfare state, radical welfare 
reforms are needed. 
Looking more closely into the specific features of the Hungarian welfare system exhibits a large 
extent of path-dependency with the period before transition providing the background and the most 
recent years (2011 -) being characterized by proposals rather than implementations.  
Figure 2. Welfare state generosity ratios differences for the welfare state models (5-year  
 
Note: no data for CEEC CME and CEEC LME before the 1995 period.  
Source: own calculation based on OECD SOCX dataset and World Bank data.  
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2. Economic transition in Hungary focusing on the welfare system and institutional 
change3
From the point of view of the welfare state, transition is not yet completed.  A fundamental feature 
of transition is its destructive nature (Csaba, 1990, 1994) and the time horizon for transition was 
underestimated for the CEECs. While the institutional setup is compatible with market economies 
despite structural dissimilarities, the current crisis is an indicator of the incompleteness of 
institutional and regulatory change. Welfare systems in general and pension systems in particular are 
far from being sustainable (Csaba, 2011). The answers and solutions may differ from country to 
country; afterwards we will focus on Hungary. There have been several policy proposals to reform 
the welfare state itself, but the framework of their operation is still not finished yet. In our analysis 
we would like to highlight the specific features of the development of the Hungarian welfare state. 
 
In case of Hungary path-dependency means that whatever change of the system took place, the 
country’s historical experiences are inseparable from the evolved model of the ‘Hungarian’ 
capitalism. The processes of transition are fundamentally defined by the previous reform initiatives 
started in 1968, which are often referred to as ‘long reform era’ (Muraközy, 2008). The long-lasting 
effects of the market socialism still have important consequences. A whole range of countries went 
through a stage in which certain ingredients of market socialism were applied. Changes pointing in 
this direction occurred from 1949 onward in Yugoslavia and from 1953 in Hungary (Kornai, 1990). 
Among the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (excluding Yugoslavia) the 1968 
Hungarian reform can be considered as the most significant, despite all of its controversies leading to 
an increase of production and a rising standard of living (Muraközy, 2008). According to Kornai 
(1990) Hungary can rightly be considered a laboratory where some very important experiments were 
conducted. The economic reforms (reform socialism/market socialism) can be meant as an effort to 
combine socialism and capitalism to some extent. 
Foreign debt accumulation started as a consequence of the first oil crisis because of the policy-
makers aim to preserve well-being of the citizens. Increased indebtedness and the second oil crisis 
led to the introduction of new reform programs in 1982. With the aim of restoring competitiveness 
the most important elements of the reforms were the following: legalisation of informal activities 
(second economy), official recognition of small private firms (especially in the service sector), the 
opportunity for private firms to enter the financial market by issuing bonds, the formation of a two-
tier banking system and the introduction of a new, market-conform tax system (Benczes, 2011).  
                                                          
3 For detailed introduction to the transition stages of Hungary see Annex 2.  
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How did all these reform processes affect welfare services?  
The market reforms from the early eighties led to marketisation which significantly increased both 
aggregate and individual-specific uncertainty; as compensation, the state did not hesitate to embark 
on generous welfare programmes. Welfare services became tools of the short-sighted state elites for 
compensating the losers of the economic reforms. As a consequence of these reform programmes, 
generous welfare spending became and is still an untouchable part of social rights, making the 
conduction of the necessary reforms even more difficult from a political point of view (Benczes, 
2011).  
Political change opened the door to radical economic reforms to replace the system of central 
planning, however economic restructuring requires more time than revolutionary political upheaval. 
Only a few Eastern European countries realised how challenging this process would be (Somogyi, 
1993). The major problems of perfecting market economy were the unemployment and the capital 
shortage in these countries. At that time (before the first free election) Hungary had several 
favourable reforms laid down in advance, such as an almost complete price liberalisation, the 
Companies Act4 and the Transformation Act5
Hungary is often cited as a prime example of gradualism (Condon – Dervis, 1993) based on the lack of 
shock therapy compared to countries like Poland, Bulgaria or Russia. In the context of post-socialist 
transition gradualism was applied to avoid political conflict, it was equalled to timidity and 
unwillingness to change (Csaba, 2011). The overall unique feature of the Hungarian transformation 
can described as “transformation without stabilisation” (Csaba, 1995:195). To link Hungary’s 
experience to the debate on the speed of the transition Benczes (2011) claim that the gradualist 
character of the Hungarian transformation was not the result of a conscious decision of the freely 
elected government, but a historically determined path dependent outcome of a two-decade long 
reform process which culminated in the political change of 1989. The early years of the Hungarian 
transformation, however, were burdened with ambiguity and a lack of coherence in policy decisions. 
 and an evolving spontaneous privatisation (Csaba, 
1995). Since several reforms were implemented there was no need to apply a big bang approach for 
the transition. Hungary is often picked up as an example of gradualism, however for example the 
bankruptcy law of 1992 represents a classical case of big bang approach and even the big bang 
approach advocates of some sort of gradualism (Carmignani, 2003).  
                                                          
4 Enacted on 1 January 1989 in Hungary, the Companies Act (Act VI of 1988 On Economic Associations) introduced the 
complete structure of economic associations with and without legal entity. (Kállay – Lengyel, 2008) 
5 Taking effect on 1 July 1989, the Transformation Act (Act XIII of 1989 on the Transformation of Economic Organisations 
and Economic Associations) was designed to control how organizations can be transformed into one of the new forms 
introduced by the Companies Act. (Kállay – Lengyel, 2008) 
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On the one hand the socialist system was characterised by full employment consequently there was 
no need for unemployment insurance, on the other hand the contributions to the pay-as-you-go 
system was fully secured. Thus before 1989 budget deficit was financed by the significant surplus of 
the pension fund. Transition brought salient restructuring which led to dramatic decline in 
employment. Therefore in 1989 Hungary introduced a system of unemployment compensation and 
then established an insurance-type unemployment benefit system in 1991 (OECD, 1995). The 
pension system bore the brunt of costs of the introduction of a new system. 
Figure 3. Development of labour force in Hungary (1991-1996) 
 
Source: IMF (1997) pp. 5. 
Due to the transformation recession the welfare system being so generous was placed under even 
more financial pressure aggravating further its unsustainability. In an effort to dampen the additional 
burdens, the government resorted to inflate expenditures in an era of double-digit inflation (Figure 
2). Between 1989 and 1996, the real value of welfare expenditures decreased by 35 percent (Ferge 
1999:165). As a consequence, tensions over the sustainability of pay-as-you-go systems increased in 
a more vigorous way. 
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Figure 4. CPI (end year) in Hungary (1991-1996) 
 
Source: IMF (1997) pp. 5. 
By the early 1990s, a drop of the universally provided welfare services can be observed. As part of 
this process, the previous health care service was replaced by a compulsory insurance-based system. 
During the 1990s the labour force participation (especially for women) fell significantly, while a rise in 
unemployment can be observed, which was especially sharp for men. Government-supported 
pension policies, intended to mitigate the effects of declining labour demand, were mainly 
responsible for the decrease in participation. Most people leaving the labour market became eligible 
to some social provision, such as old age pension, disability pension, or maternity allowance. By 
1995, the share of benefit recipients among the working age population reached 31 per cent. 
Pension schemes were used to reduce open unemployment since the mid 1980s and after the 
transition this practice was expanded (Duman – Scharle, 2011). This compensation process carried 
out by the extension of pension schemes could dampen the negative effects of the transition, 
however in the long run it has become the cause for the unsustainability of the pension system.  
During the 1990s studies show that the cutting back of the “premature welfare state” was 
successfully achieved in Hungary. During the decade after transition the decrease in welfare 
expenditure of the government budget was significant. The decrease in expenditure did not really 
mean the real reform of the welfare systems and the solution of their problems. Basic problems can 
be determined as following: (i) still very high welfare expenditures,  (ii) the lack of systematic reform 
of the big allocation systems, (iii) the citizen’s perception of worsening quality of public services 
despite the high costs.  The welfare system cannot really help to solve the worsening social and 
income problems following the change of the political system (Muraközy 2004).  
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Fiscal consolidation period for Hungary started in March 1995 (nine months after the election held in 
1994). This can be concluded as an institutional shock therapy (Bokros ‘package’), fiscal adjustment 
and reforms were introduced with salient expenditure cuts, using the tool of surprise inflation and 
introducing the crawling devaluation of the currency (Csaba, 2009). In the course of stabilization the 
government intended to rein the domestic demand through income policy restrictions on the flow of 
wages, by freezing the salaries in budget institutions and public companies. The inflation rate 
increased to over 26 per cent due to the discretional measures (devaluation, additional customs 
duty) of the stabilization package resulted in the rocketed inflation of 29 per cent. Accordingly, the 
real wages were devalued by 10-12 per cent, thus the competitiveness went through an improving 
phase. The domestic demand orientation turned into export orientation which became decisive in 
the area, and the rate of welfare expenditures went through a significant shrinkage in proportion of 
GDP. Before the consolidation the deficit was 5-7 per cent of GDP two years in a row, and this fact 
forced the government in 1995 to intervene through the introduction of a tuition fee in higher 
education, the application of needs-based principles in the social supply system. Furthermore, the 
maternity benefit (GYED) and the maternity leave (GYES) were bound to income limit; the retirement 
age was raised to 62 years and co-payment was introduced for some health services (e.g. dentistry, 
pulmonary screening) (Horváth et al, 2006).  
The 1995 stabilization resulted in a remarkable, but merely provisional decrease in expenditures. The 
increase in spending began again especially since 2000, and its speed became faster in 2002. The 
consolidation could not be durable. By now we can claim with reasonable certainty that the 
temporary cut in the affluent welfare expenditures, without any notable structural changes, are 
counter-incentives of the successful long-run stabilization (Tagkalakis, 2009). 
As a reaction to the pressure on the pension system, there was a wide-spread feeling among 
decision-makers that to solve the short- and long run problems of the pension system, it should also 
be partially privatised and prefunded. After long-standing debates the new three-pillar pension 
system was introduced in 1998 (Simonovits, 2009) and maintained until January 2011 (Égert, 2012). 
The first pillar is a traditional pay-as-you-go system, the second pillar was a fully-funded private 
pension fund scheme based on mandatory contributions until the reform in 2011, now operates as a 
pension fund only for the 3 per cent of the insured. The third pillar introduced in 1993 is a voluntary 
private pension fund (Parniczky, 2000). Hungary undertook significant reforms with the introduction 
of a funded second pillar in 1998 (and third pillar in 1993) in order to reduce pressures of the rather 
expensive social security system, but these changes have recently been reversed, making the 
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prognosis for the future rather uncertain (OECD, 2012). Currently the pension system seems to be 
unsustainable.  
Hungary underwent a ‘cold shower’ consolidation in 1999 (and another in 2003), however, every 
episode of fiscal tightening was followed by an even stronger fiscal expansion. Despite a so-called 
‘cold-shower’ fiscal consolidation after the elections in 1998, the increase of expenditures was 
substantial, so it can be concluded that the ‘cold-shower’ adjustment was an unsuccessful attempt. 
As for the revenue side, the tax brackets were halved and the government also mitigated the amount 
of the social security contribution paid by the employers. The reason behind the increasing 
expenditures was partially the dominance of domestic demand and consumption-driven economic 
policy with its already introduced measures (salary increase in the public sector, public transfers such 
as pension increase).  
To sum up we can say that only reform of the pension system was carried out in 1998, any other 
comprehensive reforms were put off, however the pay-as-you-go system was reinstalled again in 
2011. After the Bokros package (in 1995) there was no development in this field, although this would 
have been the most desirable way to decrease government expenditure in the long run, and would 
have moderated public consumption, and would have given resources for sustainable growth.  
3. Specific features of the Hungarian transition 
3.1 The role of the local governments in the welfare system 
As far as the social insurance system is concerned, the local governments are responsible for the 
provision of the services. The Hungarian public finance system can be divided into two levels and four 
sub-systems. The central budget plays the major role at the level of the central government, 
furthermore, the Health Insurance Fund and the Pension Insurance Fund and the separated state 
funds belong here as well. The second level is the sector of local governments (Kovács, 2006). 
Hungary was one of the first transition countries which implemented a reform of its 
intergovernmental system. After the transition as a result of a series of legislative acts and reforms in 
1990 and 1991 Hungary abandoned its old three-tier system and established the legal framework for 
a two-tier system of government. The Law on Local Self-government6
                                                          
6 Act LXV of 1990. Available in Hungarian at http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=99000065.TV 
 dramatically reduced the 
responsibilities of the 19 counties and the autonomy of local governments was increased. Citizens 
were granted the right to establish autonomous self-governments. The problem of the 
decentralisation process was that it was driven in large part by a political intent to diminish the old 
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system, but as a consequence it led to excessive fragmentation (Dethier, 2002). This fragmentation 
means that there are now approximately 3200 local governments, the average number of inhabitants 
per municipalities is less than 3200, and about 1670 local governments have less than 1000 
inhabitants (Vigvári, 2009).  
Welfare services have been mainly provided by the local governments which resulted in the 
indebtedness problem of the local tier. The wide range of compulsory provision of local public 
services entails that local governments are obliged to provide primary education, basic health and 
social welfare provisions, waste disposal, safe drinking water, public lighting, and to maintain local 
public roads and cemeteries. They are also obligated to enforce the observance of rights of national 
and ethnic minorities. Other tasks, which are not all mandatory, include providing local mass 
transport, settlement development, snow removal, fire protection, and public security and the 
explicitly voluntary provision of cultural and sports facilities, housing, and public safety (Dethier, 
2002). As part of the reform processes with the new Act on Local Governments 2011 the voluntary 
tasks can be delegated to the local governments only if their maintenance does not endanger the 
mandatory tasks. Further limitation is that these voluntary tasks can be financed only by own 
revenues or by other financial sources especially assured for them. Another tool to handle the 
indebtedness problem of local governments is that education is operated by the central government 
since September 2012. 
The local governments are important economic actors, on the one hand the supply of public services 
influences the labour market and on the other hand they are significant debtors. Between 2001 and 
2007 government debt increased continuously, reaching 66 per cent of GDP, the general government 
deficit was the highest in this period, and it was accompanied by much slower GDP growth (Table 1.). 
At third quarter of 2011 government debt reached 82.6 per cent of GDP (Eurostat 2012). Special 
feature of this period is the debt-generating role of local governments. In 2001 the contribution to 
public debt of the local governments was 0.4 per cent of GDP, in 2005 it was 1.7%, and this share 
intensified further reaching 2.9% in 2007. It can be concluded that between 2001 and 2007 15 per 
cent of debt growth can be attributed to the local governments (GKI 2011). The dynamic has 
continued, the total debt of the local governments between 2006 and 2009 doubled, increasing to 
3.9% of the GDP (Széll Kálmán Plan 2011).   
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Table 1. The main features of indebtedness in Hungary (1990-2010) 
 
Average budget 
deficit (% of GDP) 
Average annual change of 
the debt to GDP rate 
(percentage point) 
Real GDP index (%, 
100 = previous 
period) 
Debt ratio (% of GDP) 
1990-1994 5.3 3.4 85 1994 90 
1995-2001 5.6 -5.3 126 2001 52 
2002-2007 7.5 2.3 122 2007 66 
2008-2010  4.1 4.7 95 2010 80 
Source: GKI (2011) pp. 2. 
Obviously, the introduction of a debt break for the local governments is essential in order to dampen 
their bias towards indebtedness. The main problem of the welfare system is the fulfilment of public 
services in a better quality and different structure, e.g. the share of education is considerably lower 
in Hungary than the OECD average. Equal access to public services has to be ensured, however the 
fragmented local governmental structure does not make it possible. The current nationalisation of 
public services tends to solve this shortcoming of the Hungarian system, but because of the short 
time frame it is far beyond the scope of our analysis. Without change in the financing system the 
current local governmental and welfare system as well are unsustainable. 
3.2 Gender aspects of the transition process 
Why are gender dimensions of salient interest in contemporary post-communist welfare regimes? 
Communist welfare states were distinctive in their treatment if women, the system can be 
characterized as “dual breadwinner, double burden” system (Cook, 2010). However there were 
several special benefits for women including extended maternity leaves, subsidized child care and 
generous family benefits (especially in Hungary and Poland), at the same time the division of 
domestic work was extremely unequal, the share of women’s unpaid care work was dominant 
(Pascall – Lewis, 2004).  
As a consequence of the transition high unemployment and economic insecurity have affected 
women more, undermining the previous dual breadwinner model. Women’s labour market 
employment rates have fallen dramatically. Labour market participation is a key measure of gender 
inequality. Employment among women dropped dramatically in all CEE countries; however gender-
specific discrepancy in employment rates is lower in all CEE countries (except the Czech Republic) 
than in the Western EU countries. In CEE countries the end of state socialism has brought diminishing 
support for women’s labour market participation (Pascall – Kwak, 2010: 117).  
The following table concludes the major developments of employment with special focus on the 
differences between genders. Beside the CEE data the Swedish data represent the dual earner 
model, the French the modified male breadwinner, while the Irish the strong male breadwinner 
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model, Germany is represented as a benchmark. Gender differences can be measured by different 
indicators as well, such as job security, gender pay gap, part-time work, parental leave, but the 
picture for the region and Hungary is quite similar in this regard. In terms of unemployment rate it 
can be concluded that the changing economic circumstances make both men and women vulnerable 
to losing jobs.  
Table 2. Gender differences in employment rates in CEE and reference countries 
  2000 2007 2011 
  Males Females 
M-F 
difference Males Females 
M-F 
difference Males Females 
M-F 
difference 
EU (27 countries) 76.0 57.3 18.7 77.8 62.1 15.7 75.0 62.3 12.7 
Bulgaria 60.2 50.7 9.5 73.4 63.5 9.9 66.6 61.2 5.4 
Czech Republic 80.2 61.9 18.3 81.5 62.4 19.1 79.9 61.7 18.2 
Estonia 72.4 62.9 9.5 81.4 72.5 8.9 73.5 67.6 5.9 
Latvia 68.2 59.3 8.9 80.1 70.7 9.4 67.5 65.3 2.2 
Lithuania 67.4 63.9 3.5 76.5 69.5 7.0 67.5 66.6 0.9 
Hungary 68.9 53.9 15.0 70.2 55.5 14.7 66.8 54.9 11.9 
Poland 68 54.2 13.8 70.2 55.5 14.7 72.2 57.6 14.6 
Romania 75.4 63.0 12.4 71.0 57.9 13.1 69.9 55.7 14.2 
Slovenia 73.2 63.6 9.6 77.5 67.1 10.4 71.8 64.8 7.0 
Slovakia 70.0 57.2 12.8 76.0 58.7 17.3 72.7 57.6 15.1 
Germany 76.5 60.9 15.6 79.1 66.7 12.4 81.4 71.1 10.3 
Ireland 82.8 57.9 24.9 83.0 64.4 18.6 68.2 59.4 8.8 
France 75.6 60.3 15.3 75.0 64.8 10.2 73.9 64.7 9.2 
Sweden 80.1 75.3 4.8 83.1 77.1 6.0 82.8 77.2 5.6 
Source: Eurostat  
In case of Hungary, employment rate is one of the lowest, and women’s labour market 
participation has decreased and reformed social security systems have further negative impacts on 
gender discrepancies. However these results are even better than for the Mediterranean countries, 
where traditionally women’s labour market participation is much worse. When we would like to 
understand the real nature of the situation in Hungary we have to bear in mind that market 
participation was compulsory for both gender, CEECs and Hungary were an example of the dual 
earner model, in which women were supported as full-time workers, with high levels of support of 
childcare, family benefits and parental leave, high public expenditures on health care and education 
services, and generous welfare entitlements.  
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4. Concluding remarks 
Hungary is one of the worst-hit countries of the current financial crisis among the CEE countries. The 
deteriorating economic performance of the country has its historical roots. A high ratio of 
redistribution, a high and persistent deficit and accelerated indebtedness are the consequences of 
the communist and the post-communist period.  
It can be concluded that gradualism in the Hungarian transition was applied to avoid political conflict, 
it was equalled to timidity and unwillingness to change with a few elements of big bang approach as 
well. The gradualist character of the Hungarian transformation was not the result of a conscious 
decision of the freely elected government, but a historically determined path dependent outcome of 
a two-decade long reform process which culminated in the political change of 1989. The early years 
of the Hungarian transformation, however, were burdened with ambiguity and a lack of coherence in 
policy decisions. For further policies the culture and routine of gradualism lead to the resistance to 
shock-therapy.  
The welfare expenditures are still very high, they are over OECD average, however the gap has 
started to close by 2010. The citizens perceive worsening quality of public services despite the high 
costs. Creating welfare state generosity ratio, it can be concluded that Hungary ranks in the middle, 
however in general generosity has been significantly decreased, but further reforms are needed.  
There is a lack of systematic comprehensive reform of the big allocation systems which has been 
accompanied with hectic changes of the taxation system. As far as the social insurance system is 
concerned, the local governments are responsible for the provision of the services which resulted in 
the indebtedness problem of the local tier. In 2011 reform of the local governmental system took 
place to handle this process. By now we have enough empirical evidence to claim with reasonable 
certainty that the temporary cut in the affluent welfare expenditures, without any notable structural 
changes, are counter-incentives of the successful long-run stabilization.  
To dampen the negative labour market consequences of transition, government-supported pension 
policies were intended to mitigate the effects of declining labour demand. Most people leaving the 
labour market became eligible to some social provision, such as old age pension, disability pension, 
or maternity allowance. By 1995, the share of benefit recipients among the working age population 
reached 31 per cent. Pension schemes were used to reduce open unemployment since the mid 1980s 
and after the transition this practice was expanded. This compensation process carried out by the 
extension of pension schemes could dampen the negative effects of the transition, however in the 
long run it has become the cause for the unsustainability of the pension system. By socio-economic 
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transition the long-run evaluation of any compensation scheme is a key issue for managing 
sustainability in the long run. 
Transition have had different impact on women, one of the most crucial element of these changes 
are the gender specific differences of labour market participation. As a consequence of the transition 
high unemployment and economic insecurity have affected women more, undermining the previous 
dual breadwinner model. Women’s labour market employment rates have fallen dramatically. 
Labour market participation is a key measure of gender inequality, employment among women 
dropped dramatically in all CEE countries; however gender-specific discrepancy in employment rates 
is lower in all CEE countries (except the Czech Republic) than in the Western EU countries. Hungary’s 
situation (beside Poland) is special because female employment is the lowest. In general we can 
conclude that in the CEE countries the end of state socialism has brought diminishing support for 
women’s labour market participation.  
Building up a modern and efficient market-driven welfare state in post communist economies 
requires decades for reaching political consensus in different approaches (health, housing, education, 
research, etc.) and developing institutional and legal framework. Even the most advanced CEE 
economies are at the very beginning of this process, and low quality of political debates and political 
elites can be described as the major obstacles on this way (Koźmiński, 2011). In general at any socio-
economic transition the correct configuration of the time frame is a key factor in order to avoid 
unrealistic expectations and growing resistance in the long run.   
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Annex 1.  
Table 1. Welfare state generosity ratio for OECD countries (1980-2011) 
Year/Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 
Nordic countries                    
Denmark 1.09 1.01 1.05 1.30 1.37 1.39 1.37 1.26 1.23 
Finland .. 1.27 1.46 1.04 0.98 1.08 1.17 1.15 1.12 
Netherlands 1.03 1.13 1.25 1.17 1.22 1.10 1.26 1.19 1.18 
Norway 1.47 0.97 1.03 1.12 1.15 1.12 1.32 1.26 1.24 
Sweden .. 1.45 1.54 1.20 1.23 1.17 1.14 1.06 1.05 
Group mean  1.19 1.17 1.27 1.17 1.19 1.17 1.25 1.18 1.16 
Coeffiecient variation 16.14% 15.10% 16.41% 7.38% 10.49% 9.75% 6.89% 6.29% 6.06% 
Anglo-Saxon/Liberal                   
Australia 0.66 0.65 0.73 0.79 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.96 .. 
Canada 0.81 0.82 0.93 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.84 .. 
New Zealand .. .. 1.14 1.03 1.06 1.14 1.12 1.09 .. 
Ireland .. 0.73 0.68 0.77 0.86 1.04 1.02 0.94 0.88 
Switzerland .. .. 0.81 0.97 0.99 1.00 .. 0.96 .. 
United Kingdom .. 0.73 0.74 0.81 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.96 
United States 0.72 0.69 0.75 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.87 0.88 0.89 
Group mean  0.73 0.73 0.83 0.87 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.91 
Coeffiecient variation 8.75% 7.40% 17.91% 10.31% 7.67% 9.09% 9.33% 7.61% 3.98% 
Continental                   
Austria .. 1.33 1.31 1.41 1.40 1.27 1.32 1.31 1.26 
Belgium .. 1.04 1.12 1.04 1.07 1.03 1.18 1.15 1.19 
France 1.02 1.12 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.19 1.25 1.23 1.20 
Germany .. .. .. 1.13 1.11 0.91 1.00 0.99 0.99 
Group mean  1.02 1.16 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.10 1.18 1.17 1.16 
Coeffiecient variation .. 13.13% 10.87% 14.14% 13.43% 14.66% 11.58% 11.88% 10.32% 
Mediterranean                    
Greece .. 0.76 0.80 0.72 0.69 0.75 0.85 0.75 0.65 
Italy 0.86 0.92 0.80 0.70 0.79 0.91 0.99 0.97 0.95 
Portugal 0.55 0.49 0.68 0.75 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.81 
Spain 0.70 0.54 0.67 0.56 0.66 0.81 0.75 0.71 0.67 
Group mean  0.70 0.68 0.74 0.68 0.77 0.85 0.88 0.83 0.77 
Coeffiecient variation 22.65% 29.83% 9.92% 12.01% 16.60% 10.15% 12.26% 14.25% 18.42% 
CEEC                   
CEEC CME                   
Czech Republic .. .. .. 1.02 0.85 0.85 0.97 0.94 0.95 
Hungary .. .. .. .. 0.96 0.98 0.91 0.82 0.79 
Poland .. .. .. 0.92 0.72 0.68 0.99 0.94 0.88 
Slovenia .. .. .. .. 1.03 0.96 1.02 0.99 0.96 
Group mean  .. .. .. 0.97 0.89 0.87 0.97 0.92 0.90 
Coeffiecient variation .. .. .. 6.85% 15.08% 15.89% 4.94% 8.18% 8.92% 
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CEEC LME                   
Estonia .. .. .. .. 0.49 0.53 0.65 0.59 0.63 
Slovak Republic .. .. .. 0.79 0.60 0.59 0.78 0.72 0.70 
Group mean  .. .. .. 0.79 0.55 0.56 0.71 0.65 0.66 
Coeffiecient variation .. .. .. .. 13.88% 7.09% 13.07% 13.86% 6.93% 
Other OECD countries                   
Iceland .. .. .. 0.94 1.10 1.14 0.97 0.92 0.92 
Israel .. .. .. 1.05 0.91 0.86 0.90 0.94   
Japan 0.92 0.87 0.79 0.80 0.74 0.76 0.83 .. .. 
Korea .. .. 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.50 0.67 0.62 .. 
Luxembourg .. 1.24 1.28 1.25 1.29 1.21 1.24 1.26 1.20 
Mexico .. .. .. 0.37 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.70 .. 
Chile .. .. 0.84 0.98 0.78 0.63 0.60 0.56 .. 
Turkey .. 0.21 0.48 0.47 .. 0.61 0.64 .. .. 
                    
Overall mean 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.95 0.97 
Coefficient variation 28.72% 34.70% 31.92% 27.73% 25.61% 23.61% 21.62% 21.52% 20.60% 
Notes and sources: Country groups are created based on Sapir (2006) and the cluster analysis conducted by Schweickert 
(2013). Methodology based on Castles (2004) pp. 37, Table 2.4. Using different data sources there are slightly different results 
for some countries in year 1980. Welfare state generosity ratio is calculated by dividing social expenditure data (total public 
social expenditure as a percentage of GDP – OECD SOCX dataset) by the sum of the percentage of the population aged 65 and 
over (percentage of total population – World Bank data) and the percentage of the civilian population unemployed (total 
unemployment rate as percentage of total labour force – World Bank data). All calculated figures are subject to rounding 
errors.  
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Annex 2.  
Stages of the transition process  
1. Institution-building directing inherently towards a gradual transition into market economy 
(1980s-1990) 
During the socialist period, Hungary was the most open among the CEE countries because of 
historical ties with Western Europe and the specific socio-political compromise of the Kadar era. In 
1982 small private firms were recognised, informal activities were legalised (Benczes, 2011), this year 
Hungary joined the IMF and the World Bank in the wake of a severe liquidity crisis. Hungary sought 
IMF membership to safeguard its reforms and get assistance with its foreign debt (Cohn, 2009). 
Other important element of economic reform processes were the introduction of soft-bankruptcy 
law (1984, 1986), the establishment of the two-tier banking system (1987) and the tax reform in 
1988 (progressive personal income tax, gross and net income, corporate tax, VAT) (Blejer – Sagari, 
1991). In 1990 a multi-party election took place for the first time since World War II, the government 
was formed by Hungarian Democratic Forum party, lead by József Antall, along with the Alliance of 
Young Democrats, a party with a libertarian free market-orientation, and several other smaller 
parties (Buss, 2000). 
2. The stage of gradual-transition (1990-1995) 
Hungary employed a gradualist approach in its transition strategy and as a consequence of its earlier 
introduced economic reforms, and it was accompanied with the formation of a ‘pre-mature’ welfare 
state. Under Antall legal institutions (economic and political) were set up in record time, political 
regime change (private ownership, market-friendly political power, trade and price liberalisation, 
freeing up labour market, diminishing the barriers against private enterprises) took place. The 
government accomplished much, but was unable to politically enforce economic discipline necessary 
to privatize the economy, reduce growing budget deficits, and pay off increasing public debt (Buss, 
2000). This was the time when privatization was accelerated, choosing its own unique path7
                                                          
7 For detailed analysis see: Papp et al. (1998), Mihályi (1997a) and Mihályi (1997b). 
.  The 
prolonged economic recession led to the re-election of the Communist Party, renamed the 
Hungarian Socialist Party, in May 1994. Transformation recession totalled at 18 per cent of the GDP 
by 1993, Hungarian GDP only reached its 1989 level in 2000. At the same time total employment fell 
by 24 per cent between 1989 and 1997, most dramatic  in the region. Real wages in 1999 were on 
average 15 per cent less than in 1989 (Fink, 2006). The fall in employment generated new challenges 
and the introduction of special welfare services. 
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3. The stage of the stabilisation package and its legacy (1995-2000) 
Nine months after its victory the government decided to start a fiscal consolidation in March 1995 
which consisted of restrictive fiscal policy and an expansive monetary policy. The depreciation of the 
currency by 9 per cent (followed by the adoption of a pre-announced crawling peg system with a 
band of +/- 2.25 per cent) resulted in surprise inflation. In the following years the new system 
restored the predictability of monetary policy. Surprise inflation could contribute to the decrease of 
public expenditure in real terms (Horváth et al., 2006). The introduced austerity measures concerned 
the higher education system (introduction of a tuition fee), the family benefits, the pension and 
health care system. There was temporary cut in the affluent welfare expenditures, without any 
notable structural changes. The negotiations about EU accession started in 1997, Hungary was 
selected as first of these countries within this region (Magnin, 2002). In May 1998, new elections 
were held, the socialists were replaced by the Alliance of Young Democrats, led by Viktor Orban, and 
a coalition parties, including the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The increase of social spending 
started this time again, while jeopardizing gains made in budget deficit and foreign debt reduction 
(Buss, 2000). Hungary underwent a ‘cold shower’ consolidation in 1999 (and another in 2003), 
however, every episode of fiscal tightening was followed by an even stronger fiscal expansion. A 
comprehensive reform of this period was the introduction of the new three-pillar pension system in 
1998 (Simonovits, 2009), it was maintained until January 2011 (Égert, 2012). 2000 was chosen as a 
turning point because increase in spending intensified again especially since this year. 
4. The stage of temporary improvement and lasting decline (2000-2006) 
The beginning of this period was characterised by increasing inflation reflecting the problems of the 
narrow exchange rate band. Inflation, which declined significantly in the period of 1995–99, began to 
creep up again. In May 2001, the authorities decided to widen the fluctuation band around the forint 
parity against the euro to 15 percent, which was too wide to serve as a useful nominal anchor (Jonas 
– Mishkin, 2004). The inflation targeting (IT) regime was introduced in Hungary in 2001. Successful 
and fast disinflation strategy was hindered by large shocks, so it took four years to bring inflation in 
the vicinity of price stability (Csermely et al. 2007). Hungary’s EU accession took place in 2004, and 
about the effect of the intensive competition for EU membership one can conclude that it triggered 
some of the controversial but necessary decisions over structural reforms (Csaba, 2004). Special 
feature of the Hungarian economy is that difficulties arose five years earlier that global economic 
crisis hit other states seriously. Main economic problem is the increasing level of overspending, 
however as a consequence of relatively good economic performance (average growth rate between 
2001 and 2006 was 4.2 per cent) it became obvious later on (Egedy 2012). This period can be 
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characterized by pro-cyclical and lax fiscal policy with increasing deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Hungary has been under excessive deficit procedure since its accession. 
5. The stage of stabilisation and the unexpected spill-over of the crisis 2008 (2006-2010) 
In spring 2006 socialists were re-elected, and it turned out soon that economic outlook, especially, 
the fiscal deficit was much worse than it was communicated before. After years of lax fiscal policy the 
old-new socialist-liberal coalition started consolidation. The consolidation package included, among 
other measures, cuts in the staff of the ministries, but was mainly revenue-driven (a 4% solidarity tax 
levied on companies’ pre-tax profit, de facto raising the corporate income tax rate to 20% from 16%, 
solidarity tax for Individuals earning more than EUR 2000 a month, 15% VAT rate was raised to 20%), 
expenditure-side measures were radical cuts of subsidies on gas and electricity prices. The 
government reduced general government deficit, and initial steps of reforms in the health care 
system have been introduced, but then abolished on a referendum. To reshape the education and 
local governmental system remained plans, and the ruling coalition broke (Richter, 2012). The crisis 
found Hungary in a vulnerable state because of the shock of the consolidation; recovery was 
interrupted by the financial crisis. In 2009 GDP shrunk to nearly 7 per cent, which was well below the 
average recession rate within EU27 (-4.2 per cent). In October 2008, Hungary requested a Stand-By 
Arrangement from the IMF in the context of a rapidly spreading global financial crisis (IMF, 2012). 
The European Commission and the World Bank also provided funds to cover the financing gap. The 
stabilisation package amounted to 20 billion euros, EUR 12.5 billion stand-by agreement with the 
IMF, EUR 6.5 billion from the European Union and EUR 1 billion from the World Bank. After a 
confidence vote, in spring 2009 the next wave of fiscal consolidation was launched by a new, 
technical government headed by Gordon Bajnai. The introduced measures cut expenditures (13th 
month pension, sickness allowance) and on the revenue side VAT was increased from 20 per cent to 
25 per cent (Richter 2012). As a result, Hungary’s external financial position improved and in 2009 
the government returned back to market-based financing of the public debt. 2010 was time for a 
political turning point, the centre-right party alliance of FIDESZ-KDNP (Fidesz Hungarian Civic Alliance 
– Christian Democratic People’s Party) had a landslide victory on the elections, by gaining more than 
two third of the mandates (Vida, 2012).  
6. The stage of crisis management 2010-2013 
The new government’s main aim is to balance public finances (reducing indebtedness, keeping 
budget deficit close to 3 per cent) and to increase employment. The government introduced several 
21 
 
measures such as downsizing public administration, the reform of the pension system, and new 
special taxes on telecommunication, financial, retail and energy sectors (Vida 2012).   
Annex 3.  
Summarising the development of the social security system in Hungary 
Table 2. The development of social security in Hungary  
Period of time Benefitting group Types of 
insurances 
Financing Management and 
control 
1952-1989 wide, unified 
entitlements 
health-, accident-, 
pension insurance 
in the group of 
compulsory 
insurance system 
contributions and 
budgetary support 
without 
autonomous 
financial and asset 
management 
state controlled 
union management 
and supervision 
after 1989 the principle of 
compulsory social 
insurance system; 
the range of 
contributors 
decreased due to 
the rising 
unemployment  
beyond the health-, 
accident-, and 
pension insurance, 
unemployment 
benefit system was 
added; after 1998, 
the second pillar in 
the pension system 
was introduced 
(mandatory private 
pension system) 
contributions, 
voluntary 
contributions, state 
guarantee and 
market-based asset 
management in a 
narrow extent 
local governments 
created on 
corporative 
principle; after 
1998, 
nationalisation, 
separate fund for 
unemployment 
benefit system 
after 2010  de facto 
nationalisation of 
the second pillar 
(mandatory private 
pension assets) to 
reduce budgetary 
deficit and debt-to-
GDP rate (9% of the 
GDP); reviewing 
early retirement 
schemes as well as 
disability pensions 
employer and 
employee 
contributions;  
new taxes (special 
tax on financial 
organisations, 
telecommunication, 
retail and energy 
services); public 
work programme 
for unemployed 
reduction of the 
role of the local 
governments (since 
2012 education 
system is operated 
exclusively by the 
state) 
Source: Vigvári (2009) and own collection 
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